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1. Introduction
Models in which agents are randomly matched to play a fixed game have been
studied in game theory, economics and biology for many years. Excluding some
exceptions1, it is usually assumed that the action that each player chooses is inde-
pendent of his matched opponent. In other words, one action is assigned to each
player and a player’s success is measured by the performance of his action against
the distribution of actions in the population of his potential opponents.
It is quite common, however, that an agent possesses some information about his
realized opponent. For instance, a prospective employer can see the skin color of a
job candidate; and a seller of some product may know the gender of a potential buyer.
The information may be completely payoff irrelevant, meaning that the underlying
game is unchanged. But the very fact that such information is available allows agents
to use opponent-contingent strategies.
To address this issue we consider a random-matching model where each agent
is equipped with an exogeneously given categorization, which is a partition of his
potential opponents. A player must use the same action against all members of each
category in his categorization, but may use different actions against opponents from
different categories. In other words, each player’s strategy is a measurable (with
respect to his categorization) function from the set of his potential opponents to
his action set. This reflects a situation where opponents within each category are
indistinguishable in the eyes of the categorizer.
To define an equilibrium2 in such an environment consider a realized match of two
agents. Each of the two agents only knows the category to which the other agent
belongs. Thus, assuming that the strategies of all other agents are known, each agent
can compute the expected payoff he’ll obtain from each possible action. In equilib-
rium every agent plays a (measurable) strategy that maximizes this expected payoff
in every possible encounter. A slightly different interpretation3 of an equilibrium
profile is that each player i has in his mind a ‘representative agent’ for each category
in his categorization. The (possibly mixed) action of this prototype is the distribu-
tion of actions of the players in that category when they face i. In equilibrium, the
strategy of i is a best response to this distribution in every category.
We restrict attention to the case where the underlying game is a two-person
normal-form game. We consider, however, both cases of random-matching from two
populations and from a single population. Our main results are equivalence theorems
between the distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria
distributions of the underlying game. The proof that the distribution induced by an
equilibrium profile must be a correlated equilibrium distribution is straightforward.
The converse is a little more demanding.
1See Section 6 for references.
2Since there are many equilibrium concepts closely related to the one defined here, and to avoid
confusion, we prefer not to give our solution a new name. We therefore refer to it simply as
equilibrium.
3This interpretation is in the spirit of Jehiel’s (2005) Analogy Based Expectation Equilibrium.
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To illustrate our results consider the following version of “chicken”.
B
T
L R
5, 1
4, 4
0, 0
1, 5
It is well known that the probability distribution which places a weight of 1/3 on each
of the outcomes (B,L), (T, L) and (T,R) is a correlated equilibrium. Now, assume
that there are two populations N1 = {1, 2, 3} and N2 = {1′, 2′, 3′}, and that an agent
from each population is randomly selected to play the game (probability of 1/9 to
each encounter).
Each player categorizes the set of his potential opponents as follows. The partition
of player 1 is C1 = {(1′, 2′), (3′)}. Similarly, C2 = {(1′), (2′, 3′)}, C3 = {(1′, 3′), (2′)},
C1′ = {(1, 2), (3)}, C2′ = {(1), (2, 3)} and C3′ = {(1, 3), (2)}. The strategies of the
players are given in the following matrix.
1
2
3
1′ 2′ 3′
T, L
B,L
T,R
T,R
T,L
B,L
B,L
T,R
T,L
Notice that each agent’s strategy is measurable with respect to his categorization.
Moreover, the strategy of each agent maximizes (among all measurable strategies)
his expected payoff. Therefore, this strategy profile is an equilibrium in the above
specified environment.
Now, given that player 2′ was chosen from N2, the induced distribution on the set
of action profiles places probability 1/3 on each of the outcomes (T,R), (T, L) and
(B,L). The same is true for any one of the 9 agents. In particular, this implies that
the total distribution of action profiles induced by this equilibrium is the same as
the above mentioned correlated equilibrium distribution.
In Theorem 1 below we prove that, for any correlated equilibrium with rational
probabilities in any (finite) two-player normal-form game, there is a two-populations
random-matching environment and an equilibrium in this environment which induces
the given correlated equilibrium. In Theorem 2 we show that the same holds for
symmetric correlated equilibria when ordered pairs are randomly drawn from a single
population to play a symmetric game. Thus, our results can be seen as providing
another interpretation for the correlated equilibrium concept.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally defines the
random-matching environments and the equilibrium concept. In Section 3 we state
our main theorems. The proofs of the theorems are in Sections 4 and 5. Related
literature is surveyed in Section 6 while Section 7 concludes and suggests possible
extensions.
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2. The model
Let G = (A1, A2, u1, u2) be a 2-player normal-form game, where Ai is player’s i
finite set of (pure) actions and ui : A1×A2 → R is player’s i utility function, i = 1, 2.
Throughout this paper a subscript −i should be read 3 − i. As usual, we denote
A = A1 × A2 and, with abuse of notation, a = (ai, a−i) denotes the element of A in
which ai ∈ Ai and a−i ∈ A−i (for i = 1, 2). The set of probability distributions over
some finite set X is denoted by ∆(X). If µ ∈ ∆(A) then µ(ai) =
∑
a−i∈A−i µ(ai, a−i)
is the marginal probability of ai ∈ Ai according to µ and, for every ai ∈ Ai with
µ(ai) > 0, µ(·|ai) is the conditional of µ on A−i given ai.
2.1. The two-populations case. We consider a random-matching environment
with two finite and non-empty populations N1 and N2, where |N1| = n1 and |N2| =
n2. Let N = N1 × N2. Following Mailath et al. (1997), we call a meeting to a se-
lection of an agent ki from each population, who then play the game G. The vector
k = (k1, k2) ∈ N is called the cast of the meeting. The cast of the meeting is drawn
uniformly within each population and independently across populations. That is,
the probability that the cast of the meeting will be k is 1n1·n2 , for every k ∈ N .
To the above standard description we now add a new ingredient. This is the
exogenously given categorization profile which specifies how every agent partitions
the set of his potential opponents. Formally, for every ki ∈ Ni let Cki be a partition
of N−i. For k−i ∈ N−i we denote by Cki(k−i) the element of Cki which contains k−i.
For i = 1, 2, let Ci = (Cki)ki∈Ni be the profile of categorizations used by agents in
the population Ni, and let C = (C1, C2). A complete description of the environment,
therefore, is given by (G,N1, N2, C).
A (pure) strategy for agent ki ∈ Ni is a function σki : N−i → Ai specifying the
action that ki plays when confronted with each agent from the other population. For
i = 1, 2 we denote σi = (σki)ki∈Ni and σ = (σ1, σ2).
Definition 1. A strategy σki of player ki is adapted to the categorization Cki if σki
is Cki-measurable, that is σki(k−i) = σki(k
′
−i) whenever Cki(k−i) = Cki(k
′
−i). The
strategy profile σ is adapted to the categorization profile C if σki is adapted to Cki
for every ki ∈ Ni and for i = 1, 2.
Let σi be a strategy profile of population Ni and let D ⊆ Ni be a non-empty set.
We denote by σD the average strategy of the agents inD. That is, for every k−i ∈ N−i
and ai ∈ Ai, σD(k−i) ∈ ∆(Ai) is defined by σD(k−i)(ai) = |{ki∈D : σki (k−i)=ai}||D| . We
are now ready to define our equilibrium concept.
Definition 2. A strategy profile σ is an equilibrium in (G,N1, N2, C) if the following
two conditions hold:
(i) σ is adapted to C; and
(ii) For i = 1, 2, for every ki ∈ Ni and for every k−i ∈ N−i, σki(k−i) is a best
response to σCki (k−i)(ki), that is ui
(
σki(k−i), σCki (k−i)(ki)
)
≥ ui
(
ai, σCki (k−i)
(ki)
)
for every ai ∈ Ai.
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2.2. The single-population case. For this subsection we assume that G is a sym-
metric game. It will be convenient to denote the (common) set of actions by B.
Thus, A1 = A2 = B, A = B2 and u1(b, b′) = u2(b′, b) for every (b, b′) ∈ A. There
is only one population of agents denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} where n ≥ 2. In this
case, a meeting involves a drawing of an ordered pair from N . The first player takes
the role of player 1 while the second that of player 2. The drawing is uniform among
all ordered pairs of agents, meaning that the probability that the cast of the meeting
is (i, j) (in this order) is 1n(n−1) for every (i, j) ∈ N2, i 6= j.
Each agent categorizes the rest of the agents in the population. Thus, for every
i ∈ N let Ci be a partition of N \ {i}, and let C = (C1, . . . , Cn). As before, Ci(j)
is the element of Ci which contains agent j. A single population environment is
characterized by the triple (G,N,C).
A (pure) strategy for player i is a function σi : N \ {i} → B. Notice that, both
the categorization and the strategy of a player, are independent of the role of this
player in the chosen pair. Let σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) denote the strategy profile of the
population.
Definition 3. A strategy σi is adapted to the categorization Ci if σi is Ci-measurable.
The strategy profile σ is adapted to the categorization profile C if σi is adapted to Ci
for every i ∈ N .
For i ∈ N and D ⊆ N \ {i}, let σD(i) be the average strategy of the agents in
the set D when they face i. That is, for every b ∈ B, σD(i) ∈ ∆(B) is defined by
σD(i)(b) =
|{j∈D : σj(i)=b}|
|D| .
Definition 4. A strategy profile σ is an equilibrium in (G,N,C) if the following two
conditions hold:
(i) σ is adapted to C; and
(ii) For every two different agents i, j ∈ N , σi(j) is a best response to σCi(j)(i).
3. Main result
A correlated equilibrium in G (Aumann, 1974) is any distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) such
that
∑
a−i∈A−i ui(ai, a−i)µ(a−i|ai) ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i ui(a
′
i, a−i)µ(a−i|ai) for every ai ∈ Ai
with µ(ai) > 0 and for every a′i ∈ Ai, i = 1, 2.
3.1. The two-populations case. Consider a random-matching environment with
two populations (G,N1, N2, C). Let Pσ denote the distribution over A induced by
the strategy profile σ, and for every ki ∈ Ni let Pσ|ki denote the distribution over
A induced by σ given that ki was chosen from the population Ni. That is, for
(a1, a2) ∈ A,
Pσ(a1, a2) =
|{(k1, k2) ∈ N : σk1(k2) = a1, σk2(k1) = a2}|
n1 · n2
and
Pσ|ki(a1, a2) =
∣∣{k−i ∈ N−i : σki(k−i) = ai, σk−i(ki) = a−i}∣∣
n−i
.
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Theorem 1. (i) If a strategy profile σ in a two-populations environment (G,N1, N2, C)
is an equilibrium then Pσ is a correlated equilibrium in G.
(ii) For every correlated equilibrium µ with rational numbers in a game G there exists
an environment (G,N1, N2, C) and an equilibrium σ in this environment such that
Pσ|ki = µ for every ki ∈ Ni, i = 1, 2.
Remark 1. Since, Pσ = 1ni
∑
ki∈Ni Pσ|ki (i = 1, 2), part (ii) of Theorem 1 remains
valid if Pσ|ki is replaced with Pσ.
3.2. The single-population case. Fix a random-matching environment with one
population (G,N,C). For a given strategy profile σ and for every (b, b′) ∈ B2 denote
Pσ(b, b′) =
∣∣{(i, j) ∈ N2 : i 6= j, σi(j) = b, σj(i) = b′}∣∣
n(n− 1) ,
and for every i ∈ N let
Pσ|i(b, b′) =
|{j ∈ N \ {i} : σi(j) = b, σj(i) = b′}|
n− 1 .
Theorem 2. (i) If a strategy profile σ in a one-population environment (G,N,C) is
an equilibrium then Pσ is a symmetric4 correlated equilibrium in G.
(ii) For every symmetric correlated equilibrium µ with rational numbers in a game
G there exists an environment (G,N,C) and an equilibrium σ in this environment
such that Pσ|i = µ for every i ∈ N .
Remark 2. Since Pσ = 1n
∑
i∈N Pσ|i, part (ii) of Theorem 2 remains valid if Pσ|i is
replaced with Pσ.
4. Proof of Theorem 1
4.1. Part (i). This part is a special case of the main theorem in Aumann (1987)5.
For completeness we provide a proof. Let σ be an equilibrium in (G,N1, N2, C) and
fix ai ∈ Ai with Pσ(ai) > 0. Now, for every ki ∈ Ni that satisfies Pσ|ki(ai) > 0 we
have
Pσ|ki(a−i|ai) =
∣∣{k−i ∈ N−i : σki(k−i) = ai, σk−i(ki) = a−i}∣∣
|{k−i ∈ N−i : σki(k−i) = ai}|
=
∑
D∈Cki
|D|
|{k−i ∈ N−i : σki(k−i) = ai}|
·
∣∣{k−i ∈ D : σki(k−i) = ai, σk−i(ki) = a−i}∣∣
|D| .
Since σ is adapted to C we know that, for every D ∈ Cki , either σki(k−i) = ai
for every k−i ∈ D or σki(k−i) 6= ai for every k−i ∈ D. Thus, the last sum can be
4A distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) is symmetric if µ(b, b′) = µ(b′, b) for every (b, b′) ∈ B2.
5See Section 6 for an explanation.
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rewritten as∑
D∈Cki :
D⊆{k−i∈N−i : σki (k−i)=ai}
|D|
|{k−i ∈ N−i : σki(k−i) = ai}|
·
∣∣{k−i ∈ D : σk−i(ki) = a−i}∣∣
|D|
=
∑
D∈Cki :
D⊆{k−i∈N−i : σki (k−i)=ai}
|D|
|{k−i ∈ N−i : σki(k−i) = ai}|
· σD(ki)(a−i).
In words, the conditional distribution Pσ|ki(·|ai) is a convex combination of the
distributions {σD(ki)}D where D runs over all the sets in Cki which player ki plays
ai against their members. Since ai is a best response to σD(ki) for every such D it
is also a best response to Pσ|ki(·|ai).
Using a similar argument we have that
Pσ(a−i|ai) =
∑
ki∈Ni Pσ|ki(ai, a−i)∑
ki∈Ni Pσ|ki(ai)
=
∑
ki∈Ni
Pσ|ki(ai)∑
k′i∈Ni Pσ|k′i(ai)
· Pσ|ki(a−i|ai),
which means that Pσ(·|ai) is a convex combination of {Pσ|ki(·|ai)}ki∈Ni, Pσ|ki (ai)>0.
This implies that ai is a best response to Pσ(·|ai). Since this holds for any ai ∈ Ai
with Pσ(ai) > 0 and for i = 1, 2 the assertion is proved.
4.2. The result of Lehrer-Sorin. Before proving part (ii) of the theorem we take
a small detour to recall an earlier result of Lehrer and Sorin (1997)6. We will then
see that (ii) is nothing but a reinterpretation of their result.
A public mediated talk is defined by two finite sets of messages S1, S2, and an
announcement map f : S = S1 × S2 → X where X is a finite set of public an-
nouncements. In a public mediated talk mechanism each one of two players chooses
(independently and possibly randomly) a message si ∈ Si according to a distribu-
tion τi ∈ ∆(Si), and the public announcement f(s1, s2) is made. Then, each player
chooses an action ai ∈ Ai according to a decoding map θi : Si ×X → Ai.
Every public mediated talk mechanism induces a probability distribution Pτ,θ over
A in an obvious way. For a given µ ∈ ∆(A), say that a public mediated talk
mechanism simulates µ if
(1) Pτ,θ(a|si) = µ(a) for every a ∈ A, every si ∈ Si and i = 1, 2; and
(2) Pτ,θ(a−i|si, x) = µ(a−i|θi(si, x)) for every a−i ∈ A−i, every si ∈ Si and x ∈ X
having positive probability under Pτ,θ and i = 1, 2.
Theorem 3. (Lehrer and Sorin, 1997) Let µ ∈ ∆(A) be a distribution with rational
probabilities. Then there exists a public mediated talk mechanism that simulates µ.
Moreover, the mechanism can be constructed such that both τ1 and τ2 are the uniform
distributions over S1 and S2 respectively.
6We do not present here the Lehrer-Sorin result in its full generality. Rather, we present a simpler
version which is enough for our needs.
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4.3. Part (ii). Let µ be a correlated equilibrium of G with rational numbers. By
Theorem 3 there is a public mediated talk (S1, S2, f,X) and decoding maps θ1, θ2 such
that if each player i chooses his message uniformly within Si then the public mediated
talk mechanism simulates µ. We now need to define a random-matching environment
(G,N1, N2, C) and an equilibrium σ in this environment such that Pσ|ki = µ for every
ki ∈ Ni, i = 1, 2.
The two populations will be N1 = S1 and N2 = S2. For i = 1, 2 and for each
ki ∈ Ni, the partition Cki will be the one generated by f(ki, ·). That is, k−i and k′−i
are in the same category in the partition Cki iff f(ki, k−i) = f(ki, k
′
−i). The strategy
profile σ will be defined by σki(k−i) = θi(ki, f(ki, k−i)).
We start by showing that σ is an equilibrium in (G,N1, N2, C). First, σ is adapted
to C by definition. Second, fix ki ∈ Ni and D ∈ Cki . By the definition of Cki there
is x ∈ X such that D = {k−i ∈ N−i : f(ki, k−i) = x}. Denote ai = θi(ki, x). Since
the mechanism simulates µ (property (2)), and since τ−i is the uniform distribution
on N−i it follows that
µ(a−i|ai) = Pτ,θ(a−i|ki, x) =
|{k−i ∈ D : σk−i(ki) = a−i}|
|D| = σD(ki)(a−i)
for any a−i ∈ A−i. In other words, the conditional distribution µ(·|ai) is equal to
the distribution σD(ki) for any D ∈ Cki that satisfies σki(k−i) = ai for any k−i ∈ D.
Since, by assumption, µ is a correlated equilibrium ai is a best response to σD(ki)
for any such D. This proves that σ is an equilibrium in (G,N1, N2, C).
Finally, we need to show that Pσ|ki = µ for every ki ∈ Ni, i = 1, 2. This is a
straightforward consequence of property (1) in the definition of simulating, and of
the uniform distribution of the messages τ . Indeed,
µ(a) = Pτ,θ(a|ki) =
|{k−i ∈ N−i : σki(k−i) = ai, σk−i(ki) = a−i}|
n−i
= Pσ|ki(a).
5. Proof of Theorem 2
To prove part (i), notice first that Pσ is always a symmetric distribution. To show
that Pσ is a correlated equilibrium repeat the arguments of subsection 4.1 with the
necessary changes.
In contrast to Theorem 1, here we cannot apply the result of Lehrer-Sorin in
order to prove part (ii). Instead, we provide a direct proof which uses similar ideas
to those in the proof of Lehrer-Sorin but is somewhat simpler. Let µ ∈ ∆(A) be
a symmetric correlated equilibrium with rational probabilities. Assume that the
(common) set of actions is B = {b1, b2, . . . , bm}. Then µ can be described by the
matrix (ckl/d)1≤k≤m, 1≤l≤m where
∑m
k,l=1 ckl = d and ckl = clk for every 1 ≤ k, l ≤ m.
We denote ck =
∑m
l=1 ckl.
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We will need the following notation. If (x1, x2, . . . , xs) is a string of s symbols
then the Latin square corresponding to this string is the s× s matrix

x1 x2 . . . xs−1 xs
xs x1 . . . xs−2 xs−1
...
... . . .
...
...
x3 x4 . . . x1 x2
x2 x3 . . . xs x1

whose lines are successive right shifts of the string.
Now, consider the string of length 2d + 1 defined as follows (a diagram of this
string appears below). The first symbol of the string is 0. The next c1 symbols are
b1 and following them are c2 symbols of b2. We continue in this way until we reach cm
symbols of bm. This defines the first d+1 symbols of the string. The last d symbols
of the string are defined by (in this order) cmm symbols of bm, cmm−1 symbols of
bm−1, . . . , cm1 symbols of b1, cm−1m symbols of bm, cm−1m−1 symbols of bm−1, . . . ,
cm−11 symbols of b1, . . . , c1m symbols of bm, c1m−1 symbols of bm−1, . . . , c11 symbols
of b1. We call it the string generated by µ.
0 b1, . . . , b1︸ ︷︷ ︸ b2, . . . , b2︸ ︷︷ ︸ . . . bm, . . . , bm︸ ︷︷ ︸ bm︸︷︷︸ . . . b1︸︷︷︸ . . . bm︸︷︷︸. . . b1︸︷︷︸ bm︸︷︷︸ . . . b1︸︷︷︸
c1 c2 cm. . . cmm cm1. . . . . . c2m c21. . . c1m c11. . .
To illustrate the above construction consider the case where m = 3 and the (sym-
metric) distribution µ is given by
b1
b2
b3
b1 b2 b3
0
1/7
0
1/7
1/7
1/7
0
1/7
2/7
Thus, c11 = 0, c12 = 1, c13 = 0, c22 = 1, c23 = 1, c33 = 2 and d = 7. The generated
string of length 2d+ 1 = 15 is (0; b1, b2, b2, b2, b3, b3, b3; b3, b3, b2, b3, b2, b1, b2).
We now describe the environment (G,N,C) and the strategy profile σ. The popu-
lation is taken to be N = {1, 2, . . . , 2d+1}. The action σi(j) that player i plays when
he meets player j is the action that stands in the ij place of the Latin square corre-
sponding to the string generated by µ. Finally, the categorization Ci is according to
the strategy σi, that is Ci(j) = Ci(j′) iff σi(j) = σi(j′).
Let us return to the last example and consider the Latin square corresponding to
the generated string. To make the reading easier we write x = b1, y = b2 and z = b3.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 0 x y y y z z z z z y z y x y
2 y 0 x y y y z z z z z y z y x
3 x y 0 x y y y z z z z z y z y
4 y x y 0 x y y y z z z z z y z
5 z y x y 0 x y y y z z z z z y
6 y z y x y 0 x y y y z z z z z
7 z y z y x y 0 x y y y z z z z
8 z z y z y x y 0 x y y y z z z
9 z z z y z y x y 0 x y y y z z
10 z z z z y z y x y 0 x y y y z
11 z z z z z y z y x y 0 x y y y
12 y z z z z z y z y x y 0 x y y
13 y y z z z z z y z y x y 0 x y
14 y y y z z z z z y z y x y 0 x
15 x y y y z z z z z y z y x y 0
Thus, when players 3 and 5 are the cast of the meeting, player 3 plays b2 while 5 plays
b1. The categorization of player 9 is C9 = {{7, 10}, {4, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13}, {1, 2, 3, 5, 14, 15}}.
We now show that Pσ|1 = µ. A key observation which follows directly from the
definition of a Latin square is that σj(1) = σ1(2d+3− j) for every j = 2, . . . , 2d+1.
In words, the action that player j plays against 1 is the same as the one that player
1 plays against 2d+ 3− j.
Fix two actions bk, bl ∈ B (possibly bk = bl). By the last observation
{j ∈ N\{1} : σ1(j) = bk, σj(1) = bl} = {j ∈ N\{1} : σ1(j) = bk, σ1(2d+3−j) = bl}.
We claim that the construction of the generated string is such that the cardinality
of this set is 2ckl. To avoid complex notation, we leave this fact for the reader to
convince herself (the diagram is helpful). Thus,
Pσ|1(bk, bl) =
|{j ∈ N \ {1} : σ1(j) = bk, σj(1) = bl}|
2d
=
2ckl
2d
= µ(bk, bl).
Next, we show that Pσ|i = µ for every i ∈ N . Notice that, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ 2d
and every bk, bl ∈ B,
{j ∈ N \ {i} : σi(j) = bk, σj(i) = bl}+1 = {j ∈ N \ {i+ 1} : σi+1(j) = bk, σj(i+ 1) = bl}
where the summation means adding 1 to each element of the set, and with the
convention that 2d+ 2 = 1. Thus,
|{j ∈ N \ {i} : σi(j) = bk, σj(i) = bl}| = |{j ∈ N \ {i+ 1} : σi+1(j) = bk, σj(i+ 1) = bl}| .
Since we already showed that Pσ|1 = µ, it follows by induction that Pσ|i = µ for
every i ∈ N .
To finish the proof it should be shown that σ is an equilibrium in (G,N,C).
First, it is clear that σ is adapted to C. Second, fix i ∈ N and D ∈ Ci. By
construction, there is b ∈ B such that D = {j ∈ N \ {i} : σi(j) = b}. Thus,
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σD(i) = Pσ|i(·|b) = µ(·|b). Since µ is a correlated equilibrium, a best response to
µ(·|b) is b. Thus, i is playing a best response to σD(i).
6. Related literature
We start by describing the relation between our model and Aumann’s (1987). Fix a
two-populations environment (G,N1, N2, C) and consider the two-players incomplete
information game where the set of possible states of the world is Ω = N , the common
prior is p(k) = 1n1·n2 for every k ∈ Ω and, for every k ∈ Ω, the game being played
at k is G (states of the world are payoff-irrelevant). For i = 1, 2, the information
partition of player i is given by Pi = {ki ×D : ki ∈ Ni, D ∈ Cki}.
It is straightforward to see that any Nash-Bayes equilibrium of this incomplete
information game is an equilibrium of the random-matching environment and vice-
versa. By the main theorem in Aumann (1987), the distribution generated by any
equilibrium is a correlated equilibria of G. This provides a proof for part (i) of our
theorems. However, part (ii) of the theorems doesn’t follow from Aumann’s results.
More recently, Jehiel and Koessler (2007) study the notion of Analogy Based
Expectation Equilibrium (ABEE) in games with incomplete information. They mo-
tivate their solution concept by considering a learning process where agents from
two populations are randomly drawn to play a fixed game. ABEE of the incomplete
information game correspond to steady states of the learning process. Our model is
narrower than theirs since we assume that the pattern of meetings is uniform (the
same probability for every match) and since the analogy partitions are equal to the
information partitions (Ai = Pi). We hope that this note will somehow help to
construct a natural learning process converging to equilibrium.
Conceptually, the most similar paper to ours is Mailath et al. (1997). There
it is shown that equilibrium of a random-matching game with local interactions
correspond to correlated equilibria of the underlying game. In their model each agent
plays a constant strategy (opponent-contingent strategies are not allowed), but the
pattern of interactions is not necessarily uniform. This makes the equivalence proof
significantly simpler.
As opposed to our approach, most of the literature on random-matching games
study the evolution of actions in the population. Kandori et al. (1993) and Young
(1993) are two of the well-known examples. Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995)
and Mailath et al. (2000) are closer to the current paper since they allow players to
use opponent-contingent strategies to a certain extent. Finally, several recent papers
study subjects related to categorical thinking in different contexts. This literature
includes Fryer and Jackson (2007), Pe¸ski (2006), Azrieli and Lehrer (2007) and Azrieli
(2007).
7. Final remarks and possible extensions
7.1. Mixed strategies and equilibrium existence. Throughout the paper we
restricted attention to the case where players use pure strategies. That is, a strategy
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of a player is a function specifying the pure action that this player uses when facing
each possible opponent. A result of this restriction is that equilibrium may fail to
exist in some environments. Indeed, if a two-populations environment consists of one
player in each population, and the game G has no pure equilibrium then there is no
equilibrium in this environment.
Consider the case of two populations7 and assume that players can use mixed
strategies. Here, we understand mixed strategies in the ‘behavioral sense’, meaning
that a mixed strategy for player ki ∈ Ni is a function σki : N−i → ∆(Ai). The defi-
nition of equilibrium can be changed in an obvious way to allow for mixed strategies:
First, the strategy of each player should be constant in each of the atoms of his cat-
egorization; second, σki(k−i) should be a best response to the average (or expected)
strategy of players in Cki(k−i) when they face ki.
Notice first that allowing players to use mixed strategies eliminates the possibility
of equilibrium non-existence. Indeed, if µ1 ∈ ∆(A1), µ2 ∈ ∆(A2) is a Nash profile of
G then the strategy profile σ where σki(k−i) = µi for every ki ∈ Ni and k−i ∈ N−i
(i = 1, 2) is an equilibrium for every categorization profile C.
Second, we claim that part (i) of Theorem 1 holds even if mixed strategies are
allowed. Indeed, fix ki ∈ Ni, D ∈ Cki and ai ∈ Ai such that σki(k−i)(ai) > 0 for
k−i ∈ D. Then ai is a best response to σD(ki). If D¯ is the union of all such sets D
then it is not hard to check that Pσ|ki(·|ai) is a convex combination of {σD(ki)}D⊆D¯,
which implies that ai is a best response also to Pσ|ki(·|ai). It follows that Pσ is a
correlated equilibrium.
Finally, we conjecture that any correlated equilibrium (not just those with rational
probabilities) can be obtained as the induced distribution of an equilibrium in a
random-matching environment, when players are allowed to use mixed strategies.
Whether this is true remains to be determined.
7.2. Non-adapted strategies. Let G be a game with payoffs as in the following
matrix.
a1
a′1
a2 a
′
2
0, 0
2, 0
2, 0
0, 0
Consider the two-populations environment (G,N1, N2, C) where N1 = {k1}, N2 =
{k2, k′2} and Ck1 = {N2}. Assume that σk2(k1) = a2 and σk′2(k1) = a′2 (notice that
players in N2 are indifferent among all the possible outcomes of the game). In this
case, player k1 is indifferent between a1 and a′1 since both give an expected payoff of
1.
Now, if player k1 plays the (non-adapted) strategy σk1(k2) = a1 and σk1(k
′
2) = a
′
1
then the resulting Pσ is not a correlated equilibrium even though his actions are
optimal against the average strategy of his opponents. This example shows that the
7The following discussion, with necessary changes, is valid in the single-population case as well.
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requirement of adapted strategies is necessary for our results. A similar example can
be constructed for the single-population case.
7.3. Games with more than 2 players. Throughout the paper we only considered
games G with two players. One can, however, generalize the model to allow for
games with any number m ∈ N of players. Assume that there are m different
populations N1, . . . , Nm, and that every k = (k1, . . . , km) ∈ N :=
∏m
i=1Ni is chosen
with probability 1∏m
i=1 ni
(ni := |Ni|).
It is not clear in this case what should be the definition of a categorization of a
player. There are two options. The first is that a categorization of player ki ∈ Ni is
any partition of the product
∏
j 6=iNj . The interpretation of such definition is that
each player categorizes the set of possible compositions of opponents. The second
option is that only product partitions are allowed. That is, player ki has a partition of
every Nj , j 6= i and Cki is the product of these partitions. Here, player ki categorize
each population separately and categorize the composition of opponents accordingly.
In my view, the second option is behaviorally more plausible8.
If the first option is used to define a categorization then the result of Theorem 1
holds in this generalized setting. The proof of this assertion uses a more general form
of the Lehrer-Sorin (1997) result. We do not know if the theorem is true when only
product partitions are allowed. It is also not clear how to generalize the definition
of categorization in the single-population model.
7.4. Common categorization. One may want to consider the case where all agents
are using the same categorization. A natural question is weather any correlated
equilibrium can be achieved with this additional restriction. The negative answer to
this question is a consequence of the following argument.
Assume that in a two-populations environment (G,N1, N2, C) the categorization
profile C satisfies Cki = Ck′i for every ki, k
′
i ∈ Ni and for i = 1, 2. Denote the
(common) categorization of Ni by Ri (i = 1, 2). Fix any two sets D1 ∈ R1, D2 ∈ R2.
Now, given that (k1, k2) ∈ D1 × D2, the induced distribution over A is a product
measure and, moreover, the marginal distributions over A1 and A2 constitute a Nash
equilibrium of G. It follows that the induced distribution Pσ is in the convex hull of
the set of Nash equilibria of G. Since in general there may be correlated equilibria
outside this convex hull, not any correlated equilibrium can be obtained.
7.5. A continuum of agents. Our model can be adapted quite naturally to the
case where the population consists of a continuum of agents. Consider the two-
populations case where N1 and N2 are two copies of the interval [0, 1] endowed with
its Borel field. A meeting in this case is a random selection of a point in the square
[0, 1]2. For i = 1, 2, every ti ∈ Ni has a (measurable) partition Cti of N−i. A strategy
8There is also a third intermediate option where elements of Cki are restricted to be product sets,
but Cki is not necessarily a product partition. It is not clear how to interpret this kind of partitions.
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for player ti is a (measurable) function9 σti : N−i → Ai. One can then define an
equilibrium in a similar way to that of Definition 1.
Similar results to those of this paper can be proved for the continuous case as
well. If the probabilities of the correlated equilibrium µ are rational then one can
simply repeat the proof of the finite case, where individual agents are replaced by
equi-length intervals. We conjecture that any correlated equilibrium (not just with
rational probabilities) can be induced by some equilibrium in such an environment.
This subject is beyond the scope of this paper.
7.6. Comparing categorization profiles. An interesting direction of research which
we didn’t pursue here is the effect that different categorization profiles can have on
equilibrium payoffs. Assume that two environments (G,N1, N2, C) and (G,N1, N2, C ′)
are given. Can anything be said about the relation between the sets of equilibrium
payoffs in the two environments?
7.7. Endogenizing the categorization profile. In our model the categorization
profile is part of the exogeneously given environment. It would be interesting to fur-
ther develop this type of model by relaxing this assumption. One possible approach10
is to introduce a first stage to the game where each player chooses his categorization,
and to consider Nash equilibria of the extended two-stage game.
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